National Council of the Judiciary

Abstract

The article explores the evolution of the system for selecting and appointing of judges in Peru, from the 1933 Constitution to the 1979 Constitution. Initially, under the 1933 Constitution, judges were appointed by the Legislative or Executive branches, which implied excessive political interference, undermining judicial independence. In response, there was a proposal to create an autonomous National Council of Justice, but it was not until 1969 that this became a reality, although marked by deficiencies due to political influence and the lack of appointment of elected judges. Subsequently, the 1979 Constitution contemplated the National Council of the Judiciary, composed of magistrates, lawyers and professors, without representatives of the political branches. However, it also faced problems of political influence in appointments, which hindered efforts for judicial independence. In view of this, the author advocates for an independent judicial system and proposes that the election and appointment of judges should be the responsibility of an autonomous body composed of full-time legal professionals.