The Principle of Cooperation Between States and The International Monetary Fund

Abstract

In contrast to classical international law, which limited itself to the maintenance of international peace and security as its fundamental object, contemporary international law emphasises that the achievement of this object implies economic growth. Thus, the Principle of Sovereign Equality of States is limited to its meaning of legal equality, while existing economic and social inequality is recognised, and rules are established in favour of the special category of ‘developing countries’. In addition to the Principle of the Prohibition of the Use of Force or Threat of Force, the Principle of Cooperation is added, which obliges states to cooperate with each other to achieve economic growth, particularly in developing countries. The author proposes a study of the validity of the Principle of Cooperation in the international monetary sphere. To this end, he studies three aspects of the International Monetary Fund that have been particularly criticised by developing countries: the distribution of voting power; the weak link between the creation and distribution of Special Drawing Rights and development; and the conditionality in the use of the Fund's resources.