State International Responsibility for Autonomous Weapons and Cyber Operations: Attribution, Traceability, and Challenges for International Humanitarian Law

Abstract

This article examines how autonomous weapons systems and cyber operations challenge the law of State responsibility, focusing on attribution, traceability, and compliance with International Humanitarian Law (IHL). Building on the Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA) and the core IHL principles of distinction, proportionality, and precautions, the paper argues that today’s problem is not a legal “gap” but an operational accountability deficit: technological opacity, distributed supply chains, and the transnational architecture of cyberspace make attribution harder to evidence and weaken pathways to responsibility. Using an analytical and comparative approach, the study advances a functional reinterpretation of traditional attribution and control tests by integrating complementary standards: technical traceability, system foreseeability, enhanced duties of prevention and due diligence, and meaningful human control over critical decisions. It further proposes a life-cycle framework (design–deployment–use) to strengthen attribution and responsibility for omissions, and concludes with targeted normative and policy recommendations to support clearer accountability in algorithmic and cyber-enabled warfare, including avenues for regional standard-setting.