Some Critiques that Can Be Made from Levinas to the Notion of "Justice" of Paul Ricœur and John Rawls
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.18800/arete.201501.005Keywords:
Ricœur, Levinas, justice, love, RawlsAbstract
The well known conference of Paul Ricœur ‘Love and Justice’, pronounced when he received Leopold Lucas award in 1989, shows a dialectical tension between those two notions, and searches deeper in the philosophical –and even theological– basis that reveals love as rectification and safeguard of justice; without love, justice would be cruel, utilitarian and, paradoxically, unfair, remembering us the old Roman adage: “summum ius, summa iniuria”. Moreover, Levinas, in his “Talmudic Lesson on Justice”, compiled after in New Talmudic Readings, presents a less intuitive position, but no less interesting: justice is the place of forgiveness and love, it becomes humane everything it touches, and that’s why it doesn’t need correction; a justice that needed love, had maybe never been true justice. Here lies a critic that complements and improves both, the theory exposed by Paul Ricœur and its Rawlsian basis.Downloads
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Medina Delgadillo, J. (2015). Some Critiques that Can Be Made from Levinas to the Notion of "Justice" of Paul Ricœur and John Rawls. Areté, 27(1), 87–99. https://doi.org/10.18800/arete.201501.005
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