Wittgenstein: Instinctive uncertainty and conceptual diversity

Abstract

Important theories about the attribution of mental contents and/or linguistic
meanings propose a theoretical characterization about mental and linguistic
understanding. As one of the consequences of this, they cannot account for
instances of genuine conceptual diversity: the exotic expressions and their conceptual repertoires must be re-describe by means of a theory, articulated in our conceptual repertoire, that eliminates that diversity. Wittgenstein, on the other side, has argued that understanding of the linguistic and non linguistic behavior of other creatures is based on primitive ways of reciprocal understanding, settled on practical agreements. Consequently, he has characterized our relationship towards radically estrange behaviors as a form of “instinctive uncertainty”. On these bases, I will attempt to show how it is possible to dissolve skeptical problems and elude contrived solutions about other “forms of life”, recognizing that genuine conceptual diversity is possible.