Verdad y justificación en la filosofía de Donald Davidson
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.18800/arete.201102.002Keywords:
truth, justification, correspondence, truth conditions, DavidsonAbstract
“Truth and Justification in Donald Davidson’s Philosophy”. In this paper, I attempt to discuss the tensions that exist in Davidson’s work between hisconception of beliefs as veridical by nature and its radical opposition to epistemictheories of truth. With this purpose, I introduce two modalities of philosophicalelucidation: analytic non-reductive elucidation and connective elucidation. I alsoclaim that these two modalities are characteristic of two periods of Davidson’sway of dealing with the concept of truth. I attempt to show that the considerationof these two types of elucidation allows shedding light on the way in whichDavidson’s work deals with the problem of truth and on the particular abovementionedtension.Downloads
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Published
2011-12-01
How to Cite
Caorsi, C. (2011). Verdad y justificación en la filosofía de Donald Davidson. Areté, 23(2), 263–276. https://doi.org/10.18800/arete.201102.002
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