Damage quantification in price fixing cases
Keywords:
Antitrust, Cartels, Price fixing, Overcharge, Economic harm, Fine, Illicit profit, Damage quantification, Leniency, Passing on effectAbstract
Although price-fixing agreements are just one inside the group of restrictive competition practices, they are always harmful from a general economic welfare perspective because they do not admit any efficiency explanation, therefore, in terms of economic impact evaluation, the harm caused by these practices, requires a priority attention. The authors present economic concepts related to the economic harmful in price-fixing cases and brings some guidelines about estimations based on recent literature and casuistry about the anticompetitive practice’s quantification.
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Published
2020-07-22
How to Cite
López Medrano, G., & Arenas Román, P. (2020). Damage quantification in price fixing cases. Derecho & Sociedad, 2(54), 135–149. Retrieved from https://revistas.pucp.edu.pe/index.php/derechoysociedad/article/view/22439
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Section
Derecho Administrativo Sancionador Especial








