The inconvenience of the reasonable person standard in criminal law

  • Juan Pablo Pérez-León Acevedo Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú

    Reseacher, Åbo Akademi University Department of Law/Institute for Human Rights, Åbo, Finland.Lawyer, Pontifical Catholic University of Peru. Master in Laws (LLM), Columbia University. Doctor in Law, Åbo Akademi University. Email: jperez@abo.fi

Resumo

Following American legal sources, I argue that the use of the reasonable person standard in criminal law is inaccurate and unfair, and, therefore, inconvenient to evaluate human behaviour based on three arguments which address flaws of the standard under analysis. Firstly, this standard is  by definition  abstract, theoretical  and  general, not  reflecting appropriately the person’s sensory and ideational perception of the situation. Secondly, the trend in American legislation and case-law is to apply, in criminal cases, e.g., self-defence, a hybrid criterion, which consists in the consideration of a person’s belief and the correspondence of such a belief to what a reasonable person would believe under the circumstances, as opposed to a purely objective standard. The principle of individual criminal culpability underlies this. Thirdly, the reasonable person standard imposes a sort of majority’s dictatorship by perpetuating a predominant culture disregarding the viewpoints from minority groups.

Referências

Donovan, Dolores and Stephanie Wildam (1981). «Is the Reasonable Man Obsolete? A Critical Perspective on Self-Defense and Provocation». Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review, 14 , pp. 444-445.

Fletcher, George (1978). Rethinking Criminal Law. Boston/Toronto: Little Brown, p. 247.

Fletcher, George (1988). A Crime of Self-Defense: Bernhard Goetz and the Law on Trial. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, p. 40.

Fletcher, George. A Crime of Self-Defense, p. 42.

Lee, Cynthia (1996). «Race and Self-Defence: Toward a Normative Conception of Reasonableness». Minnesota Law Review, 81 , p. 387.

Lundy, Thomas (2009). «Instructing on the Objective Reasonable Person Standard». TheChampion, 33 , p. 48.

Maguigan, Holly (1995). «Cultural Evidence and Male Violence: Are Feminist and Multiculturalist Reformers on a Collision Course in Criminal Courts?».New York University Law Review, 70, pp. 41-43.

Nourse, Victoria (2008). «After the Reasonable Man: Getting over the Subjectivity/Objectivity Question». New Criminal Law Review, 11 , p. 33.

People v. Goetz, 497 N.E.2d 41 (N.Y. 1986).

Simons, Kenneth (2008). «Self-Defense: Reasonable Beliefs or Reasonable Self-Control». New Criminal Law Review, 11, p. 77.

Singer, Richard (1986). New York Law Journal, 18 February 1986, p. 1. Cited by Fletcher, George. A Crime of Self-Defense..., p. 60.

State v. Bellino, 625 A.2d 1381, 1384 (Conn. App. 1993).

State v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8, 10 (N.C. 1989)

State v. Peoples, 621 S.W.2d 324, 327 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981).

U.S. Model Penal Code § 3.04 (1) (a).

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Como Citar
Pérez-León Acevedo, J. P. (2014). The inconvenience of the reasonable person standard in criminal law. Derecho PUCP, (73), 505-509. https://doi.org/10.18800/derechopucp.201402.015