Nuclear Posture and Transatlantic Counter-Hegemony: A neorealist case analysis of the Anglo-French nuclear postures and US counter-hegemony over Europe

Abstract

In light of the most recent debates during the Trump administration, the study seeks to answer why the US is combining a reduction in its presence in Europe with a strengthening of NATO under its tutelage. To reconcile this apparent contradiction, it is postulated that the degree of nuclear autonomy from Washington would be a key factor in explaining this phenomenon, given that total autonomy would also represent nuclear autonomy. In neorealist terms, European nuclear autonomy would represent a loss of US counter-hegemony in Europe.
To this end, a case study of the different reactions of the US towards the nuclearisation of the United Kingdom (partial support) and France (diplomatic opposition) is carried out. This process corresponded with a reorientation of US interests and subsequent attempt at military withdrawal from Europe, conditions very similar to those currently prevailing. Consequently, two hypotheses are formulated: the greater the degree of European nuclear autonomy, the greater the erosion of US counter-hegemony; the greater the erosion of counter-hegemony, the more hostile Washington’s reaction will be. Hence, two variables are formulated –nuclear dependency (ND) and counter-balancing effect (CBE)– which allow the formulation of the following observable expectations (OE):
• OE-FR-1: 1958 French memorandum demanding a tripartite veto or threatening to leave NATO (CBE ≥ 4).
• OE -FR-2: Withdrawal from NATO’s integrated military structure (1966) as an indicator of CBE = 5 and ND = 1.
• OE -UK-1: Accession to MC-48 and renunciation of the European veto (ND ≥ 4, CBE ≤ 2).
• OE-UK-2: Eisenhower–Macmillan Agreement (1958): nuclear cooperation + non-transfer clause (ND ≥ 4).

From this explanation, it can be concluded that opposition to the French nuclear programme was due to its clear autonomy and Paris’s subsequent revisionist behaviour, in contrast to London’s drift towards subordination. Henceforth, it is concluded that the US maintains incentives for promoting greater conventional autonomy but never greater nuclear autonomy in Europe. These results contribute to understanding the structural limits of US transatlantic (counter-)hegemony in contexts of strategic autonomy.