Regulating the Intolerance of Contractual Breaches

Authors

  • Andrés Talavera Cano Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú

    Abogado por la Pontifica Universidad Católica del Perú. Con estudios adicionales en el Programa de Intercambio Estudiantil de la University of Wisconsin - Madison (International Commercial Arbitration / Introduction to the American Law / Comparative Law). Profesor del curso de “Destrezas Legales I” en la Facultad de Derecho de la Universidad Pacífico. Profesor adjunto del curso “Derecho Civil XI: Responsabilidad Civil” en la Facultad de Derecho de la Universidad de Lima. Miembro de Lex Arbitri. Asociado del Estudio Bullard, Farra, Ezcurra.

Keywords:

Penalty Clauses, Moratoria Penalties, Countervailing Penalties, Pact o Further Damage, Economic Analysis

Abstract

To penalize contractual breaches allows efficient allocation of risks in a contract, ensuring and maintaining the contractual equilibrium that the parties had in mind and shaped in its contractual regulation. The intelligent use of penalties will safeguard and maintain the economic balance of the contracts, thus maintaining the profitability of business operations pursued through them.

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Published

2016-02-07

How to Cite

Talavera Cano, A. (2016). Regulating the Intolerance of Contractual Breaches. IUS ET VERITAS, 24(52), 194–201. Retrieved from https://revistas.pucp.edu.pe/index.php/iusetveritas/article/view/16379

Issue

No. 52 (2016)

Section

Artículos

License

Copyright (c) 2017 IUS ET VERITAS

Creative Commons License

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.