The desorientaded aerialist: Evolutionary dynamics of contract clauses in predisposed contracts and the poor quality myth of consumer contracts
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.18800/derechopucp.201501.011Keywords:
consumer, consumption agreement, autonomy of the willAbstract
The standard-form agreements, pejoratively labeled as “adhesion contracts”, have bad reputation. A significant number of academics and most of consumer protection authorities often believe that the absence of negotiation and the preponderance of rights and benefits assigned to suppliers (versus costs, obligations or limitations imposed to consumers) show a kind/ sort of abuse against an alleged weak party of the consumption relationship. In this article, Professor Rodríguez García states that the skeptic and hostile vision regarding the standard-form agreements is wrong and is based on a poor understanding of the incentives and purposes that this type of contractingfulfills. On the contrary, the author intends to state that the control of clauses included in consumption contracts is prejudicial to consumers. Therefore,this is a control type that should be removed from the legal system.Downloads
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