Maxims of experience in the rational assessment of evidence: Proper and improper use from a gender perspective

Authors

  • Raquel Limay Chavez National University of San Marcos https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9278-1067

    Master in Probative Reasoning from the University of Girona (Spain) and Genoa (Italy). She is a lawyer from the National University of San Marcos, she has a master’s degree in Criminal Sciences from the same house of studies and in the International Program of Specialization in Legal Argumentation at the University of Alicante. She is founder of the Peruvian Institute of Probatory Reasoning. Jurisdictional advisor of the Supreme Court of Justice of the Republic of Peru in the Criminal Chamber for processes of High State Officials.
    Email address: r.limay@pucp.edu.pe.

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.18800/iusetveritas.202102.011

Keywords:

Rational assessment, Gender perspective, Evidence, Maxims of experience, Stereotypes, Biases, Warrant

Abstract

The present paper intends a doctrinal, legal and jurisprudentially analysis of the so-called maxims of experience in the assessment of evidence from two perspectives: rational or epistemological and gender perspective. Both approaches are relevant because the first approach conceives the maxims of experience as assessment criterion and empirical generalizations with conditional form, susceptible to be classified as true or false if it does not correspond to an empirical verification. The second point of view, will allow showing the improper interpretation and application of these assessment criterion as arguments based on of biases and gender stereotypes, mainly, in sexual crimes, and that are hidden under the denomination of maxims of experience of the judge, this directly affects the rational assessment of evidence making this a simply subjective appreciation.

Downloads

Download data is not yet available.

Published

2021-11-26

How to Cite

Limay Chavez, R. (2021). Maxims of experience in the rational assessment of evidence: Proper and improper use from a gender perspective. IUS ET VERITAS, (63), 208–223. https://doi.org/10.18800/iusetveritas.202102.011