Public Policy as a Limitation on the Patentability of Inventions and Utility Models: The Case of Patents on Weapons of Mass Destruction and Dual- Use Technologies

Abstract

The objective of this paper is to analyze how the prohibition on patenting inventions whose commercial exploitation would be contrary to public policy is applied in the context of weapons of mass destruction and dual-use technologies. The methodology is qualitative, combining a doctrinal and comparative legal analysis with a systematic review of academic literature in law, security, and technology. The results reveal a global consensus on excluding weapons of mass destruction, but with heterogeneous mechanisms in key jurisdictions: the European Union uses an explicit “public policy” clause; the United States relies on the “moral utility” doctrine and national security secrecy orders; and China combines a “public interest” exclusion with a defense patent system. The main conclusion is that the contemporary challenge lies not in conventional weapons of mass destruction, but in emerging dual-use technologies and autonomous weapon systems, which blur the line between civilian and military applications, testing the effectiveness of existing legal frameworks.