Bid rigging or collusive tendering: What, when and how is a hard core cartel produced under this mode?

Authors

  • Juan Santiago Chang Tokushima Baxel Consultores

    Abogado. Magíster en Economía, Regulación de los Servicios Públicos y Competencia por la Universidad de Barcelona. Socio de Baxel Consultores (Lima, Perú).
    Contacto: jchang@baxel.pe

  • Mario Fernando Drago Alfaro Baxel Consultores

    Abogado. Programa de Políticas Públicas de la Universidad del Pacífico. Profesor de la Universidad del Pacífico (UP) (Lima, Perú). Socio de Baxel Consultores (Lima, Perú).
    Contacto: mdrago@baxel.pe

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.18800/themis.202201.009

Keywords:

Collusion, Tendering, Collusive tendering, Bid rigging, Hard core cartels, Naked cartels, Ancillary doctrine

Abstract

In the last couple of years, the National Institute for the Defense of Competition and the Protection of Intellectual Property has focused its efforts on the persecution and sanction of horizontal practices, initiating a substantial step in favor of improving free market competition.
This paper analyses the reasons why public bid riggings are considered per se illegal conducts by our national legislation, as well as how the National Institute for the Defense of Competition and the Protection of Intellectual Property has prosecuted and sanctioned these practices. The authors consider that classifying bid riggings as per se illegal is a consequence of their social impact, since there aren’t any economic reasons
that differentiate them from other per se illegal conducts.

Downloads

Download data is not yet available.

Published

2022-12-15

How to Cite

Chang Tokushima, J. S., & Drago Alfaro, M. F. (2022). Bid rigging or collusive tendering: What, when and how is a hard core cartel produced under this mode?. THEMIS Revista De Derecho, (81), 119–134. https://doi.org/10.18800/themis.202201.009